THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA
Thursday, August 4, 201611:45 AM - 1:15 PM (Pacific)
The Lee Jung Sen Building
Langrun Yuan, Peking University
Speaker:
ADAM LIU Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, Stanford University
Date: August 4th, 2016 (Thursday)
Time: Lunch at 11:45; Presentation and discussion 12:00 – 13:15
Developed, competitive banking systems are crucial for economic development. Yet, both cross-country and historical research has found that the emergence of such banking systems requires the rise of a limited government in the first place. Set against the extant literature, China becomes a big anomaly: the number of commercial banks in China has increased exponentially in the reform era without political change. Building and exploiting a unique spatial dataset covering all Chinese banks and bank branches built in the reform era—combined with existing datasets on Chinese firms, archival materials, as well as fieldwork—my dissertation seeks first to distill the political economic logic of bank proliferation in China, and second to assess the economic and distributive consequences of bank proliferation.
Registration:
Email: sanjiu39@stanford.edu
Phone: 010-6274 4163